Defense is one thing, but the US has equipped and supported the Saudi-led, UAE-backed barbaric assault on Yemen, making American leaders complicit in a never-ending series of war crimes. Embarrassingly, the administration apologized for failing to act quickly enough to safeguard Abu Dhabi from Yemeni reprisal for the deaths of thousands of civilians. And neither state is repaying previous US benefits, rejecting Washington's frantic pleas to increase oil production.

The United States should advise the Saudi and Emirati royal families to deploy their costly arsenals for defense rather than aggression. In reality, the most serious threat to those governments currently is from within—how many Emiratis or Saudis want to die for a privileged royal elite? Allow these governments to work together and with Israel to bring Iran back into balance, or better yet, establish a modus vivendi that allows Sunnis and Shiites to coexist together.

The President and Congress set aside $40 billion for Ukraine, nearly as much as Russia spends on its military each year and more than any European country except France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. This is also significantly more than the Europeans have given Kyiv, despite the fact that their combined economy is nearly as great as America's, and they have long neglected to take their own defense seriously. Russia's attack on Ukraine evidently matters to them far more than it does to the United States. In the midst of Europe's ostensible military awakening, they should lead the charge in supporting Kyiv. So far, the crisis that is meant to rekindle European military spending has cost Americans significantly more.

And with Finland and Sweden's applications to join NATO, things are only going to get worse. Neither has been endangered by Moscow, which is still embroiled in the Ukraine conflict and on the verge of losing it. Finland already has a capable military, and Kyiv has demonstrated how Europe can protect itself by allocating significant resources to territorial defense. Europeans should concentrate on their own security rather than going off the beaten path, as they did in Libya a decade ago.

Neither Stockholm nor Helsinki are crucial to the United States, which should be the basic requirement for issuing a security guarantee by Washington. That is why, despite repeated assurances, the US and the rest of Europe have refused to admit Ukraine to NATO. No one was willing to fight for Kyiv against a nuclear-armed Russia. There is no better cause than Finland or Sweden to go to war with a nuclear-armed Russia.

And it would be primarily America's responsibility to bear this load. It would not be Montenegro, Spain, or Italy that would send troops to defend Finland along its 810-mile border with Russia. If Moscow utilized nuclear weapons, neither Germany, North Macedonia, nor Greece would reply. Adding two more countries to NATO would increase the military burden on the United States even more. President Dwight D. Eisenhower urged the United States against becoming like "a contemporary Rome protecting the distant boundaries with our legions." When will Europe take on this load if it does not do so when it sees a credible military threat?

There's also Asia to consider. The President is also eager to rebuild America's partnerships in the region, which will entail more spending. He welcomed ASEAN members, who represent Southeast Asian countries, to the United States before heading to Asia for summits with members of the Quad and South Korea's incoming president. Friendly regional nations uniting to limit the People's Republic of China is the ideal reaction to China.

That would, however, necessitate them spending more money on their militaries and taking responsibility for day-to-day security concerns. After decades of relying on the US to perform the military heavy lifting, Japan appears to be only now ready to spend more than 1% of GDP on its military. The ruling party is considering a two-percentage-point increase, but this is unlikely unless Washington makes it clear that it will no longer be the region's guardian. It is Japan's responsibility to defend the uninhabited but contentious Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from the PRC.

South Korea, as well. Because the potential threat is greater, it has a higher protection responsibility. The Republic of Korea has a GDP of nearly 50 times that of North Korea, twice the population, and a massive technological advantage. And while the ROK has survived the COVID epidemic, the North is facing a potentially devastating infectious tsunami now that the Omicron strain has broken through its locked borders. Why should Washington have an army division stationed on the peninsula? Why not construct and deploy ROK units to fill the gaps currently covered by US forces?

Foreign and military policy should be tailored to the situation. During the Cold War, when friendly governments were recuperating from World War II and both the USSR and the PRC posed substantial military concerns, a stronger US role was required. That world has passed us by.

That isn't to say that Washington is immune to security threats. They are, however, not the same. Above all, friendly states can do a lot more for themselves and their communities. President Biden should move security duties from the US to its defense welfare beneficiaries, rather than putting Americans' lives at danger for longer periods of time and increasing America's debt.

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President Joe Biden announced a new US policy toward Taiwan for the third time, only to have his officials assert that nothing has changed. While this may appease the populace, other countries, particularly the People's Republic of China, are not fooled.

The president's statement roiled the area during his trip to East Asia, which was supposed to persuade friends and allies that Uncle Sam can walk and chew gum at the same time. "Yes," he said when asked if he would defend Taiwan, adding, "it's a commitment we made." His statements whizzed across the world at breakneck speed, appearing to condemn Washington's doctrine of "strategic ambiguity," in which the US declined to state its position on a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

Since the Carter administration severed diplomatic connections with Taiwan, which was then known as the Republic of China, and recognized the People's Republic of China, America's defense ties with Taipei have been murky. Washington maintains unofficial diplomatic relations with the island nation and is legally obligated to sell it defense weaponry. Taiwan, on the other hand, has neither a defense treaty nor any other formal military commitment, like Japan and South Korea do. Making American policy a simple "maybe."

Strategic Ambiguity as a Strategy

The risk of losing US assistance is expected to dissuade Taipei from dangerously pushing Beijing, according to theory. At the same time, the PRC is expected to refrain from military action in the event that the US decides to intervene. And there you have it: America has the best of both worlds. However, the inverse outcome is also possible. Taiwanese citizens may feel that eight decades of collaboration in war and peace indicate that the United States will act on their side. Furthermore, the Chinese may conclude that no sane American president would sacrifice Los Angeles in favor of Taipei.

In reality, strategic ambiguity appears to be a way to delay making a decision. As long as policymakers are not required to deliver a clear yes or no, they are not required to make a clear yes or no decision. They can also simply pray that the contingency never occurs.

China is unwavering in its support for reunification

This technique, however, is becoming increasingly unworkable. Although there are no signs of immediate Chinese military intervention, Michael Swaine of the Quincy Institute notes that "this possibility cannot be ignored in the longer term if current trends persist." Beijing's patience looks to be wearing thin: Chinese President Xi Jinping has warned against the issue being "passed down through the generations." The People's Republic of China has increased diplomatic and military pressure on Taiwan, while the government of Xi Jinping appears to have abandoned using Hong Kong as a model for negotiating consensual reunification.

Furthermore, China's time may be running out. The PRC is grappling with major demographic, economic, and political issues, which are being exacerbated by the Xi regime's zero COVID policy. Pro-PRC sentiment in Taiwan is vanishingly small, especially among the young, according to Beijing officials. Finally, among the numerous lessons that Russia's war on Ukraine could teach Xi, the need of a swift victory may be the most significant.

Is it Time for the US to Take a Stand?

As a result, policymakers in the United States should be aware of their thoughts. They must be prepared to retaliate if China takes action. This might imply a global mobilization of diplomatic and economic strength against Beijing. This might include undermining Chinese interests indirectly, for as by prohibiting trade with and flying travel to the PRC. In the most catastrophic case, this may imply intervening directly against Chinese armed forces. In any scenario, Washington should be prepared to respond, or not act, in order to avoid being taken off guard if Beijing attacks.

Most importantly, the issue needs to be addressed right now. Within the Beltway, the largely unspoken consensus appears to be that Washington should, of course, act. It is unthinkable to most foreign policy experts that America would not respond militarily. The key point of contention recently has been whether strategic uncertainty should be addressed with strategic clarity – as the president appeared to do – by expressing a clear military commitment.

Is the United States Prepared for Strategic Clarity?

However, starting today, the American people should be consulted, according to ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Michael McCaul. "I'm not sure how many Americans would want to fight over a tiny island they've never heard of," he remarked. And if they fully comprehended the cost of defending Taiwan from China — the risk of conventional loss and nuclear catastrophe — they could be adamantly opposed.

If a crisis arises, the president must be ready to act and Congress must be ready to vote. Most crucially, it should carry out its constitutional duty and debate a declaration of war, which is required for a presidential decision to intervene militarily. A well-informed citizenry is required for such a significant decision.

Aside from safeguarding the mainland, Taiwan is China's most significant strategic goal. Most Chinese, even younger generations — who I've found to be deeply nationalistic even when otherwise liberal — feel Taiwan is part of China. Japan took the island from the decaying Chinese empire in 1895 and returned it after the latter's defeat in 1945. The Chinese Communist Party destroyed the ROC government in 1949, forcing the Nationalist Party to flee to Taiwan. The ROC maintained a separate existence, backed by the US military, but eventually lost the diplomatic game as the rest of the world, including America, legally accepted just "one China" and recognized the PRC.

Reuniting the two — i.e., subordinating Taiwan to the PRC — is the ultimate stage for the mainland leadership in ending "the Century of Humiliation," during which China was subjected to foreign invasion and occupation. The American Civil War, in which northerners refused to accept secession, is the only analogous American event in terms of nationalism at its most raw level. Following the eleven southern states' secession over slavery, the national government fought over the union, resulting in the deaths of 750,000 Americans (approximately eight million in today's figures).

Policymakers in the United States want to believe that America will triumph. Some, like former Defense Secretary and CIA Director Leon Panetta, believe that simply threatening to interfere will be enough to defend Taipei and that the PRC will back down. All the US needs to do now is declare its willingness to act, and the Chinese leadership will retire to Zhongnanhai, heads bowed, and accept American suzerainty for the rest of their lives.

Others either believe America will win or refuse to consider the potential of defeat. They disregard the potential repercussions because they believe Washington must intervene. Everything must simply work out.

Fighting the People's Republic of China for Taiwan, however, would be nothing like America's recent military experience. Iraq and Afghanistan were walkovers in comparison to the high-intensity fight against the well-armed and highly motivated People's Liberation Army, which was armed to the teeth with missiles and a growing nuclear weapons. At its worst, air and naval conflict between the United States and the People's Republic of China would transport Americans back to the Pacific War of World War II, which no one wants to replay, with a nuclear twist if such weapons were deployed against America.

Beijing also appears to be prepared to go to war if required, despite the fact that this is not its preferred option. Taiwan's submission should be discussed, according to the PRC. Some PRC leaders do not believe the US will engage in a conflict, leading to the famed taunt that America would not risk Los Angeles for Taipei. And based on any typical balancing of interests, that is a reasonable assumption. Taiwan is significantly more important to China than the United States. Imagine the People's Republic of China declaring its readiness to defend Cuba from US assault. That would be similarly absurd to Washington, especially after witnessing the Soviet Union's collapse in a similar situation six decades ago.

Most Chinese authorities, on the other hand, appear to be more pragmatic, ready for American action. Beijing benefits from the tyranny of distance: Taiwan is just around 100 miles from the mainland, about the same distance as Cuba is from the United States. Taiwan, on the other hand, is almost 7,000 miles from the US mainland and around 1.700 miles from Guam, the closest US territory. Because it is easier and less expensive to discourage than it is to project power, Washington is at a huge disadvantage. Surprisingly, the United States frequently loses war games involving a Taiwan conflict.

Despite the fact that Washington is developing tactics to counter the PRC's anti-access/area denial capabilities, even with access to NATO bases in the region, the US would struggle to win. Missile assaults would put ground facilities and naval forces at risk. Furthermore, despite Tokyo's harder stance against China and Seoul's new conservative leadership, no country is guaranteed to join the US if war looms. This would transform them into military targets and assure the PRC's hatred for the foreseeable future. If the allies believe Washington is at least largely to blame for the crisis, they will be much more hesitant to act.

Escalation appears to be unavoidable. Guam, a US possession with military installations, and Okinawa, a Japanese island with American bases and soldiers, were both targets for China. The US would almost certainly target mainland sites, with a few hundred of them potentially being deployed to support an invasion of Taiwan. Both sides would be under a lot of pressure to retaliate. According to a recent wargame, Beijing would most certainly use nuclear weapons early in any battle, with potentially fatal repercussions.

In the end, the United States may find itself committing a large portion of its military budget – at a time when the country's population is aging and deficits are quickly increasing - to combating a rising, distant opponent in its own neighborhood over critical interests. And by doing so, the United States would be risking a higher risk of nuclear war than even during the Cold War. To put it another way, the American people may find themselves facing national bankruptcy and ruin in order to deal with this single contingency: defending Taiwan from China.

Taiwan's more than 23 million people have earned the right to control their own destiny. They have established a democratic government, a market economy, and a thriving community. Risking their homeland, on the other hand, is a high price for Americans to pay, far too high. Personnel have been killed, planes have been shot down, ships have been sunk, and bases have been bombed in the war with China. In a war with China, nuclear-tipped missiles may be launched at American cities. Even a U.S. victory would be fleeting, as China might retreat and prepare for a new round, as Germany did between World Wars I and II.

It's preferable to negotiate a regional agreement that assures Taipei avoids declaring independence and maintaining military ties with other countries, while Beijing decreases military threats and endorses peaceful reunification.

Arming and training Taiwanese soldiers, preparing global sanctions in the event of an attack, and devising asymmetric military responses are all lessons learned from Ukraine. The idea should be to place the most responsibility on Taiwan while increasing the price for China rather than America.

The president's inability to keep his mouth shut is quite perilous. Ignoring the real implications of a fight with China over Taiwan is far worse. It is also a political crime to expect Americans to embrace the expenses and risks of full-scale combat with the PRC without debate. Before the Taiwan Strait becomes the world's latest catastrophe, the Biden administration should handle all three challenges.

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Naturally, the president asked an additional almost $32 billion on top of this year's spending, which were already greater than those for 2021. And, predictably, the Biden administration talks about the money as if it were intended to safeguard America. "Our budget request reinforces our commitment to the idea of comprehensive deterrence," the Pentagon declared. Deterrence is, in reality, an often mentioned military goal. Officials and analysts agree that a significant increase in funding is required to "restore deterrence," "keep or restore deterrence," and "deter attacks" and "violence."

But who is Washington trying to deter? Who is it that America is "defending"? Terrorism remains a concern, but it is not existential, and military intervention is increased rather than reduced. Other types of warfare, most notably information and cyber warfare, are real and dangerous, but they are of a different sort. Most importantly, no one has ever attacked or attempted to attack the United States militarily. Nobody is likely to do so.

Not the Europeans, who were resolved to do as little as possible militarily until the invasion of Ukraine, putting the burden of defense on Washington. Not China, which has a significant nuclear capability gap and is pursuing an anti-access/area denial policy to keep the US from invading it. Not Russia, whose conventional military lacks global reach and has severe limitations, as evidenced by its disastrous assault against Ukraine.

North Korea, on the other hand, is attempting to construct a nuclear deterrent capable of striking the American mainland in order to avoid US intervention. And not a smorgasbord of other hostile Third World countries, the majority of which couldn't even withstand the ill will of a single US aircraft carrier, let alone the complete force of the American government.

Deterrence works and does not need to be reestablished.

The United States is, without a doubt, the most secure great power in human history. Its northern and southern neighbors are weak and pacific, having long been subjugated by the American colossus militarily, politically, and culturally. Throughout America's history, wide oceans to the east and west have separated it from the world's most powerful nations. A robust navy and air force keep an extended defense perimeter, safeguard distant territories, and keep maritime passages safe. Indeed, the US navy's 11 carrier groups are more concerned with coercion than with protecting American land or commerce.

The only practical existential military danger to America today is nuclear, which is posed by a small number of countries that have ballistic missiles with the range and numbers to destroy the United States. (Long-range bombers could also pose a threat, although missiles are more likely to make it through.) Few of these states are hostile, and those that are would be subjected to terrible reprisal in the event of an attack. Despite the Russian attack on Ukraine, the nuclear threat is still far lower than it was during the Cold War.

After acquiring its part of North America, America's wars were nearly all self-initiated, and rarely fought over objectives that could be described as major, let alone crucial. (Not the Spanish-American War, World War I, Vietnam, or any of the post-Cold War battles, for example.) Only World War II and the Korean War, both of which were precipitated by previous US military engagements, could be considered genuine strategic endeavors.) Washington's conflicts could and should have been averted in the majority of cases.

When compared to America's most obvious competitors, this is a win-win situation. China shares land borders with 14 countries and shares water borders with six others. It fought Japan, the Soviet Union, South Korea, India, and Vietnam over the last century. During the same time period, Germany and other other governments invaded the Russian/ Soviet Empire twice. Moscow waged wars in Afghanistan and against China as part of the Soviet Union, and engaged militarily in Eastern Europe. India lost a war with Beijing but conquered Pakistan three times, with some battles ending in a draw. Europeans fought for ages in a kaleidoscope of continuously shifting alliances before, luckily, losing their will to fight. Regrettably, they misplaced their desire to defend themselves as well.

So, what does Washington plan to do with all of the cash flooding into the Pentagon? Defending the interests of other countries. This can be seen in Europe and Asia. Indeed, the Biden budget allocates $4.2 billion to the "US European Command, European Deterrence Initiative." "The 2023 Pacific Deterrence Initiative highlights some of the important investments that the Department of Defense is making to bolster deterrence in the Indo-Pacific area," it says.

Why are Europeans still reliant on America nearly eight decades after World War II ended, when Western Europe has recovered from the war, Central and Eastern Europe has been liberated and joined the West, and the Soviet Union has collapsed? Why is Tokyo still reliant on America nearly eight decades after World War II ended, when Japan had the world's second-largest economy and still has the third-largest? Why is the Republic of Korea still reliant on America more than seven decades after the Korean War ended, with an economy more than 50 times the size of the North's and a population twice as large?

The solution is straightforward. Because the United States continues to consider these and other countries as hapless wards of the United States. Indeed, American strategy has traditionally been to prevent Europeans from acting independently. Sure, Washington encouraged them to spend more, but only under its supervision and control.

In the case of Japan, the United States initially disarmed the island nation, only to realize later that the United States could use some assistance in defending the free world. Despite this, Marine Corps Gen. Henry Stackpole reportedly stated in 1990 that US forces must remain in Japan as an informal occupying force. He said, "No one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan." "To put it another way, we're a cork in the bottle."

The United States retains operational authority of the South Korean military during warfare, a significant loss of sovereignty. Some ROK officials are wary of relinquishing control of their own military for fear of signaling to Washington that the South no longer requires American defense assistance. It is preferable for South Korea to save a few won by remaining helpless dependent than to stand alone.

And no one in Washington appears to have any plans other than to expand America's global welfare system. With China on the rise and Russia at war, Washington's foreign policy establishment, dubbed the "Blob" by Ben Rhodes, President Barack Obama's deputy national security advisor, is naturally heading in the wrong way. With plans to increase the military budget, put American troops to new, permanent garrisons in Europe's east, and make equal force increases in East Asia, the Biden administration is pressing on even greater US commitment and control.

Indeed, the new conservative government in Korea wants Washington to return both tactical nuclear weapons and "US strategic assets, such as nuclear bombers and submarines, to the Korean peninsula." As North Korea's nuclear arsenal improves, the US will be forced to risk its cities to safeguard Seoul, a risky bargain for the US and an unbelievable one for the ROK.

If the Russian attack on Ukraine has done anything beneficial, it has deflated the fearmongering that has been used to justify ever-increasing US military budgets and European deployments. So far, Moscow has been unable to subdue Ukraine. Vladimir Putin's boast that he can pivot from Kyiv, pull an Adolf Hitler, and launch a blitzkrieg across Europe to the Atlantic must now be dismissed as a Hollywood fantasy.

Simultaneously, European nations, particularly Germany, have been pushed to take defense more seriously. For the first time since WWII's end, there appears to be widespread public support for doing more. After decades of pretending to be the all-seeing, all-knowing indispensable nation, the US should finally do less to support this transition. Only then can Europeans see the value in taking responsibility for their own security, as well as the necessity of doing so.

The defense budget of the United States should be spent solely on defending the country from attack. Ukraine's valiant and tenacious fight against Russian aggression demonstrates that Europeans can protect themselves. Likewise, America's Asian allies may be able to help. It's past time for the US government to demand that they do so.

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Related Video:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was abolished the day after Christmas in 1991. After the failed coup in August, the Soviet Communist Party was disbanded. Gorbachev had lost his job. The Soviet flag was also lowered for the final time from the Kremlin.

It was a historic victory for the United States, the West, and all of humanity. Unfortunately, what happened next was an equally exceptional chance that was squandered. As my Cato colleague Ted Galen Carpenter put it, instead of fully integrating Russia into the West, “beginning with Bill Clinton’s administration, the United States pursued arrogant and clumsy policies that ultimately culminated in the new cold war with Moscow that plagues the world today.”

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the USSR’s collapse led to extraordinary hubris. Looking back, Gorbachev cited the “triumphant mood in the West, especially the United States.” He explained: “They grew arrogant and self-confident. They declared victory in the Cold War.”

As a result, the United States today risks rekindling the Cold War with Moscow, as well as a burgeoning Sino-Russian condominium, if not alliance. The unbridled militancy and militarism that pervades Washington's foreign policy elite, particularly the Republican Party in Congress, threatens driving the United States into a shooting confrontation with Russia over Ukraine, which has never been a genuine security issue for the United States. Indeed, some Republican politicians appear to be lusting towards a massive battle.

For instance, taking a position that can only be described as demented, Sen. Roger Wicker advocated: “President Biden should make clear that there is no scenario under which Ukraine will be overrun by Russia, period. [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is already courting a bloodbath should he attack Ukrainian troops. President Biden should up the ante by warning him that an invasion would saddle him with an intolerably high Russian casualty count. This means leaving all options on the table and granting no concessions.” Wicker advocated not only intervening with ground forces, but using nuclear weapons, evidencing a judgment so malformed that he shouldn’t be allowed to visit the U.S. Capitol, let alone be elected to serve in it.

What went so horribly wrong? Fantasy became reality between 1989 and 1991. However, the immeasurable benefits of liberating hundreds of millions of people from communist oppression did not satisfy American leaders. As a result, Washington chose to take command of the situation, putting the peace at danger.

In 1985, Gorbachev became the communist general secretary. The Soviet Union was in jeopardy, but few observers predicted its demise. Gorbachev adopted half-measures toward economic reform while eschewing the harsh weapons needed to drive change. The Soviet Union was in serious trouble when 1989 began. Few predicted its demise from the legendary bipolar environment of the Cold War.

Poland had elections in the spring of that year. This would have been unimaginable in the past. The Red Army imposed communist dogma on satellite countries for decades. None of the earlier attempted liberalizations, including twice in Poland, ended well: East Germany 1953, Poland 1956, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland 1980. However, Gorbachev told Moscow’s allies that they were responsible for solving their own political problems and the Red Army would not intervene. Which made the unthinkable—a free vote and noncommunist government—reality in Warsaw.

Then a reform government in Hungary tore down its equivalent, if not quite so formidable, “Berlin Wall” with Austria, leaving a jagged hole in the infamous Iron Curtain. Some East Germans streamed out of their country and Eastern Europe. Others flooded Leipzig streets to protest their government. On November 9 the real Berlin Wall came crashing down. Protests forced the end of communist regimes in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In a stunning conclusion to a dramatic year, on Christmas Day an uncomprehending Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu, bizarre and cruel communist rulers who had wrecked Romania, found themselves before a drumhead firing squad.

Then it was the Soviet Union’s turn. The USSR was essentially a radical continuation of the Russian Empire, which always relied upon force to hold the provinces in line. Gorbachev, though a reform communist who hoped to transform and thereby save the Soviet Union, dropped this essential ingredient for the Not-Quite-So-Evil Empire to survive. Indeed, for abandoning coercion—he refused to arrest secessionists—he was derided as a “coward.” Which is why, three decades ago, he found himself unemployed and viewed with contempt. The main Soviet successor state, the Russian Federation, entered a chaotic new world.

Relations among victors and losers were never going to be easy. Unfortunately, the triumphant West made it worse, much worse. With the USSR’s collapse, NATO no longer had a serious role to play, but, as public choice economics would predict, the transatlantic alliance immediately determined to find a new raison d’etre. Among the more bizarre ideas suggested were for NATO to promote student exchanges, fight drug trafficking, and protect the environment. Ultimately the “transatlantic” alliance took on out-of-area activities, meaning wars largely unrelated to Europe’s security. Having decided to preserve the anti-Moscow alliance, its members then moved to expand it as well, despite contrary assurances to the Gorbachev and Yeltsin governments.

This reflected arrogance, most importantly. In the minds of U.S. policymakers, America represents all mankind, and everything it does is by definition moral and right. Running the world without Moscow’s interference would be a grand adventure. The Soviets/Russians had lost and there was nothing they could do to stop the U.S. Anyway, Russia would get over it. As the New York Herald wrote a century and a half earlier when advocating for the U.S. to absorb all of Mexico after its defeat: “Like the Sabine virgins, she will soon learn to love her ravishers.”

Alas, Moscow never did. Washington expanded NATO up to Russia’s borders and continued to drive eastward. Without maintaining even a pretense that expansion improved U.S. security, the alliance included such powerhouses as Montenegro and North Macedonia; the Duchy of Grand Fenwick, famed star of The Mouse that Roared, seemed likely to be next. Along with Georgia and Ukraine, which NATO promised to incorporate, despite their presence on Russia’s border.

Putin, no friend of liberty, responded with calculated brutality. When the reckless, feckless Mikheil Saakashvili, president of Georgia, fired on Russian troops while expecting U.S. backing, Moscow battered the Georgian military and applied the Serbia precedent, ensuring separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Bush administration entertained a proposal to intervene militarily—which would have triggered retaliation and perhaps even full-scale war between the U.S. and Russia. Luckily, having Sen. John McCain’s foreign policy adviser on the Georgian payroll was not enough for Tbilisi to buy U.S. intervention.

Washington and its allies also dismembered Serbia, historically allied with Russia, and backed “color” revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. In 2014, the U.S. and Europe supported the street putsch against the elected pro-Russian leader of Ukraine. The State Department’s Victoria Nuland was recorded discussing who the U.S. wanted to install as the new premier while Europe was seeking to divert Ukrainian trade to Europe. Only then did Russia act—illegally and violently, but effectively, and with greater restraint than many expected.

Rather than launch a sweeping invasion to swallow the 44 million-strong country or build a "land bridge" to Crimea, as some feared, Moscow backed rebels in the Donbas, resulting in a continuing war that made NATO membership doubtful. The Putin government also seized Crimea, which had been traditionally part of Russia and had a majority of Russian-speakers who undoubtedly wanted to reunite, securing Moscow's Black Sea naval stronghold of Sevastopol. Putin has recently escalated the confrontation by concentrating Russia's military capabilities and threatening aggressive action against Ukraine in an attempt to push the US to discuss a modus vivendi, which the US should have sought seven years ago.

Although Washington focused its ire on Putin, Russian antagonism toward the U.S. runs far deeper because of American behavior. During the 1990s, the public view of the U.S. flipped from roughly 80 percent positive to 80 percent negative. If Putin is overthrown, he might be replaced by a more extreme nationalist. Indeed, opposition politician Alexei Navalny is, or at least was, no liberal, a fact ignored by his Western supporters, who risk facing a younger and more attractive adversary if Navalny ends up in power.

It’s not too late for Washington to act. Indeed, President Joe Biden appears determined to negotiate a settlement with Moscow. Doing so won’t be easy, however.

Putin’s release of proposed treaties hikes the pressure on both sides and discourages an informal understanding. Other NATO members want to be part of any talks, even though they consistently underinvest in their militaries and would expect Washington to do all the heavy lifting in any fight with a revived Red Army. And the Ukrainians demand a seat at the table even though, contra their rhetoric, they are not entitled to NATO membership or Western aid.

The administration should advance America’s interest and be tough with allies as well as Russia. NATO expansion should end. In return, Russia should stop interfering in the Donbas. Practical understandings, if not legal resolutions, need to address seemingly unsolvable issues, such as Crimea.

The distinction between alliance members and non-members must be maintained. Defense obligations of rich, populous partners who have decided to rely on America should be transferred, not merely shared, by Washington. And, as a result of the budgetary reality, Washington will be forced to prioritize domestic priorities and abandon its ambitions to play global cop. Perhaps most importantly, the United States must reclaim the humility that has been missing from its foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union three decades ago.